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This paper considers second-best congestion pricing in the monocentric city, with endogenous 
residential density and endogenous labour supply. A spatial general equilibrium model is 
developed that allows consideration of the three-way interactions between urban density, 
traffic congestion and labour supply. Congestion pricing schemes are analyzed that are 
second-best ‘by design’ (and not because distortions exist elsewhere in the spatial economy), 
like cordon charging and flat kilometre charges. Both for Cobb-Douglas utility and for CES 
utility, the analyses suggest that the relative welfare losses from second-best pricing, 
compared to first-best pricing, are surprisingly small. 
 
*Affiliated to the Tinbergen Institute, Roetersstraat 31, 1018 WB  Amsterdam. .1. Introduction 
Practical applications of traffic congestion pricing typically (if not always) involve so-called 
second-best pricing regimes, which fail to charge every individual road user his or her exact 
marginal external congestion costs. With pay-lanes, to an increasing extent employed in the 
US, unpriced congestion remains existent on parallel highway lanes. In case of cordon 
charges, such as used in Singapore, every road user passing the cordon pays the same charge 
independent of the route followed before and after passing the cordon, and users who remain 
within or outside the cordon are exempted from paying the charge. Area charges, as recently 
introduced in London, impose the same charge on every user who drives within the area 
independent of the number of kilometres travelled, and leaves congestion outside the area 
uncharged. And flat kilometre charges, as currently considered for The Netherlands, do not 
differentiate by the place of driving and route followed. 
  A substantial literature has recently emerged on the economics of second-best 
congestion charges (e.g. Lindsey and Verhoef, 2001, provide an overview). Most of these 
studies employ partial equilibrium approaches, in which only the transport (network) market 
is considered explicitly. An exception is the work by authors such as Mayeres and Proost 
(2001) and Parry and Bento (2001), who study traffic congestion and road pricing for 
commuters in general equilibrium settings, allowing for distortions on the labour market. 
Their results suggest that these interactions can be of significant importance for the efficiency 
impacts of both congestion pricing and the use of the associated revenues. 
Another non-transport market that is of importance when evaluating congestion 
pricing strategies for urban areas is the (spatial) housing market. Already in the 1970’s, a 
number of studies appeared that looked into the interactions between traffic congestion and 
urban structure in the context of the monocentric model (Solow and Vickrey, 1971; Solow, 
1972; Kanemoto, 1976; Arnott, 1979). Anas and Kim (1996) and Anas and Xu (1999) 
extended this line of research by allowing for multicentric configurations, endogenizing the 
emergence of centres through the explicit consideration of agglomeration forces. 
The present paper aims to consider second-best congestion pricing in the monocentric 
city, with endogenous residential density and endogenous labour supply. A spatial general 
equilibrium model is developed that allows consideration of the three-way interactions 
between urban density, traffic congestion and labour supply. The model would therefore, for 
example, allow an investigation of second-best congestion pricing with distorted spatial 
labour markets. This matter, however, will be addressed in a companion paper to the present 
one (Verhoef, 2004). The present paper will instead be concerned with congestion pricing 
schemes that are second-best ‘by design’, like the examples mentioned above, and not 
because distortions exist elsewhere in the spatial economy. 
Prior studies of traffic congestion in the monocentric model have typically looked at 
first-best congestion pricing measures, although second-best issues arising from non-optimal 
allocations of land to road capacity have been considered (e.g. Arnott, 1979). The recent 
contribution by Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003) is an exception. They focus on second-Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  2
best optimal cordon pricing in a monocentric city. The policy appeared to perform 
unexpectedly well: when optimizing both the location of the cordon and the charge, welfare 
gains of around 94% of the gains from first-best pricing were found (computed from their 
Table 2). This is remarkably well when realizing that with a cordon charge, some road users 
will not face a congestion charge at all (those who live inside the cordon), some will face a 
charge that exceeds the marginal external costs they cause over their full trip (those who live 
outside but relatively close to the cordon), and a third group faces a charge below their 
marginal external costs (those who live outside and relatively far from the cordon). 
Given the potentially far-reaching policy conclusions of this finding, an important 
question is to what extent the result depends on the assumed monocentric spatial 
configuration as such, and to what extent it is the result of other specific features of their 
model, such as the facts that urban densities are assumed given, and that a partial spatial 
equilibrium model was used. One might for instance hypothesize that an important difference 
between cordon charge and first-best tolls would be that the former provides a smaller 
marginal incentive to move closer to the city centre, as there is no reward in terms of a 
reduced congestion charge. At the same time, however, a cordon tax provides a relatively 
strong non-marginal, discrete, incentive to choose a location inside the cordon. The question 
arises whether, as a result of these opposing forces, the average density in the city increases or 
decreases under cordon charges compared to first-best tolling, and to which extent the 
discreteness of the charge and the likely resulting discontinuities of land rents and densities 
induce additional welfare losses due to cordon charging. One objective of this paper is to 
explore these questions by using a spatial general equilibrium model of a monocentric city. 
Compared to the model of Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003), urban density will be made 
endogenous, trips will be assumed to involve commuting rather than other purposes (such as 
shopping), and only simultaneous equilibria of the transport market, the urban land market 
and the labour market will be considered. But as in Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003), the 
monocentric urban structure is imposed exogenously, which means in the present model that 
all production is assumed to take place in a (spaceless) CBD. A model that endogenizes the 
formation of agglomerations within the urban area is planned for future work. 
An alternative second-best policy is considered as well, and this involves flat 
kilometre charges. This means that also when marginal external congestion costs per 
kilometre driven vary over space, only a single per-kilometre congestion charge can be 
imposed throughout the city. Like cordon charges, such a policy could be motivated by 
excessive transaction and implementation costs for first-best congestion charges, typically 
requiring per-kilometre charges that vary continuously over space. Whereas the cordon tax 
does imply spatial variation of per-kilometre charges but at the cost of creating a 
discontinuity, the flat kilometre charge is in some sense its counterpart by avoiding 
discontinuities while preventing spatial variation of per-kilometre charges. 
The two benchmarks against which both policies will be evaluated are the no-toll 
equilibrium on the one hand, and first-best congestion charging on the other. Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  3
2.  The analytical model
1 
This section presents the details of the analytical model. Before turning to a detailed 
description of consumers’ behaviour, the congestion technology, firms, and a characterization 
of general equilibrium, some introductory remarks are in order. First, z will be used to denote 
a one-dimensional continuous urban space. The location of the spaceless CBD is at z=0, and 
the residential area stretches from z=0 to z=z
*, with z
* being the endogenous city boundary. At 
the boundary of the city, the equilibrium residential bid-rent r(z
*) should be equal to the 
exogenous and constant agricultural bid-rent rA. A closed city is considered, meaning that the 
population size N is treated as fixed and given. 
It is assumed that all excess land rents above rA are redistributed among the city’s 
population.
2 It is a convenient assumption in the sense that it easily allows us to consider 
households with similar initial endowments. As a result of these assumptions, some share of 
the urban production will not be consumed in the urban area, but will be exported in exchange 
for the purchase of land against the agricultural rent. 
All consumers and producers are assumed to be price-takers. Households are identical, 
and so are firms. The industrial product can be transported costlessly, and the given world-
market price of the industrial good p is used as the numéraire. We now turn to the various 
actors in the city and the resulting equilibrium issues. 
 
Consumers 
The closed city has N households, which are treated as a continuum of utility-maximizing 
economic entities. A household’s utility depends on the consumption of the industrial good y, 
on the consumption of space or the size of the residence s, and on the consumption of free 
time or leisure Tf. A household’s financial budget then consists of the net wage rate w–τL (w is 
the gross wage, τL the labour tax) times the amount of hours worked Tw, plus the redistributed 
excess land rents (R in total, R/N per household), plus – possibly – a lump-sum government 
transfer  G (which is set so as to balance the government’s budget). In equilibrium, the 
household’s budget is fully spent on the consumption of y and s, and – if levied – on road tolls 
and labour taxes. A household’s given time budget is denoted by T, and can be spent on 
leisure (Tf), work (Tw) and commuting (Tc). All prices and taxes are treated parametrically by 
the (price-taking) households. 
Commuting therefore does not require financial outlays other than possibly a total toll 
(i.e., over the full trip) τR(z), but does take time Tc(⋅z) (the underlying travel time function will 
                                                 
1 The exposition in this section closely follows that in Verhoef and Nijkamp (2002). 
2 Alternatively, an ‘absentee land-lord assumption’ could have been used, which assumes that none of the land 
rents generated in the city would be used for consumption in the city. Another possible assumption would be that 
all land rents generated in the city are redistributed among the population, which would in fact imply that the 
endogenous city size could – from the overall city’s perspective – be expanded costlessly. The present 
representation compromises between these two polar cases, and would correspond to the situation where the 
public authority of the city buys the urban land against the relatively low rural land price, implying an equivalent 
(per-unit-of time) price of rA, and redistributes all excess rents generated in the city among its population.  Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  4
be discussed below). The number of commuting trips made by a household is assumed to be 
equal to the amount of effective working time supplied (Tw). Hence, Tw is, as it were, 
expressed in terms of number of days worked. 
A household’s simultaneous labour supply and consumption decisions can be 
modelled by using the ‘gross budget’, that would be available under the maximum possible 
amount of time worked, and to let the household ‘buy back’ leisure time against the prevailing 
shadow price w–τL–τR(z). Observing that the household’s optimization problem is dependent 
on the residential location z, it can then be written as: 
( )
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Both labour taxes and road tolls are collected and redistributed by the local government. A 









+ ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ = ∫
*
0
d ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
z
R L f c z z z T z T T z n
N
G τ τ  (2b) 
where n(z) gives the density of households at z. The ‘gross budget’ available at location z is 
thus defined as: 
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A spatial equilibrium requires that utility U(z) be constant over z for all 0<z≤z
* (and exceeds 
U(z) for z>z
*). This implies a particular equilibrium pattern of land-rents. We can be explicit 
about this when postulating a specific form for the utility function. Two types of utility 
function will be considered in this paper: Cobb-Douglas (with a unitary elasticity of 
substitution) and CES (constant elasticity of substitution). In this analytical section, only the 
Cobb-Douglas function is considered, which allows for an analytical expression for 
equilibrium land rents. It is expressed as: 
1 : with









This utility function has the specific property of a unitary elasticity of substitution, implying 
that the gross budget shares spent on y, s and Tf will be constant, and given by the parameters 
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and the indirect utility – for analytical convenience defined as the logarithm of the maximum 
utility achievable under given prices and wage – can be written as: 
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where a prime denotes a ‘space derivative’ (with respect to location). Equation (7) gives a 
first-order differential equation for r(z) that can be solved to yield: 
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where K is a constant of integration. Invoking the equilibrium boundary condition that 
r(z
*)=rA, we can solve for K:  
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We conclude this part of the analysis with a few identities. We can find the local population 
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The total amount of land consumed in the city must be equal to z
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Travel times 
A single radial road of a given, constant capacity is used jointly by all households when 
commuting. The per-unit-of-distance travel time t(z) at each point along the road depends on 
the local density of commuters, defined by the cumulative labour supply between z and z
*. A 
linear travel time function is used, defined by two constants t0 (the free-flow travel time for 
one unit of distance) and t1 (the function’s slope): 
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The congestion externality is clearly reflected in (16): Tc(z) depends on labour supply at every 
location in the city. The same therefore holds for the maximum utility attainable at z; compare 
equations (1) and, specifically for Cobb-Douglas utility, (6). Because labour supply at z in 
turn depends on Tc(z) (compare (5c) for Cobb-Douglas utility), the congestion externality 
induces complex direct and indirect spatial interactions throughout the city, in terms of both 
equilibrium utility obtained and in terms of labour supply decisions. 
  Absent economic distortions other than the traffic congestion externality, first-best 
road pricing involves spatially differentiated per-unit-of distance charges equal to per-unit-of-
distance marginal external congestion costs. A problem equivalent to determining these is to 
find the marginal external congestion costs from supplying one additional unit of labour at 
every location z, and to derive the total (over the full trip) optimal road prices for trips as a 
function of trip origin z. Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  7
An additional unit of labour supplied at z increases Tc(ζ) by t1·z for ζ ≥ z, and by t1·ζ 
for  ζ  <  z. The associated marginal external costs, in monetary terms, can be found by 
expressing these increases in commuting travel times in equivalent monetary variations in the 
gross budget M(ζ). Equation (3) shows that the relevant shadow price of (leisure and work) 
time is w–τL–τR(ζ) (note that the other two consumer prices, p and r(ζ), are not directly 
dependent on Tc(ζ)). This shadow price is therefore in part directly dependent on the 
government’s use of the two tax instruments. Because n(ζ) households will be affected at 
location ζ, the marginal external costs of supplying one additional unit of labour at z, mec(z) 
can therefore be written:  
() ∫ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
*
0
1 d ) ( } , { Min ) (
z
R L w n z t z mec ζ τ τ ζ ζ  (17) 
It is verified in the numerical model in Section 3 below that a policy of Pigouvian road taxes, 
defined by τR(z)=mec(z), with the revenues redistributed in a lump-sum manner via G, indeed 
maximizes equilibrium utility in the city when the labour τL is zero and hence no distortions 
in the labour market are present. 
 
Producers 
Probably the simplest possible production structure is assumed for the city. There is a 
continuum of firms, each of which is infinitesimally small relative to the market and takes all 
prices as given. The industrial output is homogeneous. All firms are located in the spaceless 
CBD, but the agglomeration forces that induce this clustering are not modelled explicitly. 
This also means that no market distortions through agglomeration externalities are assumed to 
exist; internal consistency could be achieved by, for example, assuming that zoning regulation 
prohibits firm location outside the CBD. The assumption of exogenous, central firm locations 
is clearly an unattractive feature of the present model, which is, however, made solely to 
allow us to concentrate on the performance of second-best congestion pricing in a 
monocentric city without introducing additional market distortions arising from 
agglomeration externalities. Because these market distortions are expected to be relevant in 
reality, they are considered explicitly in the companion paper Verhoef (2004). 
Firms have a simple linear production technology with one input (labour). A firm’s 
production function thus exhibits constant returns to scale, and therefore qualifies for 
application of Euler’s theorem. The following aggregate production function applies: 
L A Q ⋅ =  (18) 
Perfect competition drives profits to zero, with the result that the following equality holds: 
w A p = ⋅  (19) 
 
 
 Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  8
General spatial equilibrium 
The model described above has 17 unkowns, some of which are functions of z. These 
unknowns are V(z), w, M(z), r(z), R, G, K, y(z), Y, s(z), n(z), Tf(z), L, z
*, t(z), Tc(z), and Q 
(recall that  rA, p and N are given; tax levels are treated exogenously and all other scalars are 
parameters). The 17 equations needed to solve this system are (2ab), (3), (5a-c), (6), (8)-(13), 
(15), (16), (18) and (19). For other types of utility and production functions, as long as they 
imply unique conditional (factor) demands, a similar equality of numbers of equations and 
unkowns should in principle hold. We refrain from a formal analysis of existence, uniqueness 
and stability of equilibria and optima in our model. 
In our list of equations, we did not include the ‘aggregate demand equals aggregate 
supply’ relation, which in our partly open system reads: 
()
* z r Y Q p A ⋅ = − ⋅  (20) 
Equation (20) states that the value of the city’s production in excess of its local consumption 
should be just sufficient to pay for the purchase of land against the exogenous terms of trade 
rA/p. The share of local production not exported is consumed locally. The reason for not 
including this equilibrium condition explicitly is that it will be automatically satisfied under 
the zero profit condition and exhaustion of consumers’ financial budgets – as in fact dictated 
by Walras’ Law. To see why, first observe that zero profits imply that: 
L w Q p ⋅ = ⋅  (21) 
The exhaustion of consumers’ total financial income, in combination with the balanced 
government budget, implies (in aggregate terms) that the sum of redistributed land rents and 
wage income should be equal to the sum of expenses on the local product and rents: 
*
*
z r Y p L w
R z r Y p L w R
A
A
⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ ⇒
+ ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ +
 (22) 
Substitution of (22) into (21) immediately yields (20). 
  It is not possible to obtain any further analytical (equilibrium) results for our model. 
We therefore now move to the results of a numerical illustration,
3 to study the comparative 
static properties of the free-market and some second-best (and first-best) equilibria. 
                                                 
3 The numerical model was written in Mathematica 5.0, and finds spatial equilibria by using a repeated nested 
approach, in which the various markets of interest are successively brought into equilibrium while keeping other 
prices fixed, until convergence is reached (the convergence criterion used in the different loops was set at 1·10
–7 
for relative changes in key variables between successive iterations within each loop). Provided reasonable 
starting values are used, this takes (for given policy instrument levels) less than 30 seconds on a modern lap-top 
computer. The flatness of the utility plots U(z) in Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the fact that the 
model succeeds in producing a spatial equilibrium in which no incentives for relocation remains. Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  9
3.  First-best and second-best road pricing: numerical results 
3.1. Calibration 
The basic numerical model used deploys the Cobb-Douglas utility function also used above. 
Although the model is of course a rather strong abstraction from reality, some effort was put 
in calibrating the model so that the main endogenous results bear resemblance to what is 
observed in reality. We therefore start this section by briefly discussing the calibration of the 
model. It should be borne in mind that the calibration aimed to produce reasonable base-case 
equilibrium outcomes for a model that is in the first place rather abstract, and that in the 
second place is calibrated under the conceptually ‘clean’ but practically unrealistic 
assumption of zero (labour and transport) taxes. 
  We start with the normalizations used. As stated, the given world-market price of the 
good produced in the city is used as a numéraire, and p is set equal to 1. Also the agricultural 
land rent is assumed to be given, and units of space are chosen such that also the agricultural 
rent rA=1. Next, units of time are chosen such that the total time endowment T=1. And finally, 
the number of households is set at 1000. 
 The  parameters  α of the Cobb-Douglas utility function determine the equilibrium 
(gross) budget shares of the industrial good, housing and leisure. The values were set at 
αy=0.2, αs=0.15 and αf=0.65. Because the monetary budget is fully spent on the industrial 
good and on housing, the first two α’s imply that some 43% of total monetary income is spent 
on housing and 57% on other consumption. This seems reasonable for urban areas. The value 
of αf, in combination with equilibrium city size and commuting times, leads to an average Tw 
of 0.29 (see also Figure 1 and Table 1 below). For an average week, consisting of 7·16 hours 
(excluding 8 hours sleep per day), this means 32 hours working time. 
  The final two parameters to be chosen are t0, set at 7.5·10
–4, and t1, set at 7.5·10
–6. The 
ratio of these two parameters causes the equilibrium speed near the CBD to be just over 25% 
of the free-flow speed (as applying at the city fringe). The absolute sizes of these parameters – 
together with the further parametrization – cause the equilibrium city size z
* to be such that 
the person living at z
* has a commuting time Tc(z
*) of 0.57· Tw(z
*). With labour supplied in 
units of 8-hour working days, this would mean a maximum commute of some 4.5 hour per 
working day (for a return trip), or 2.25 hour for a single trip. 
  Finally, in the base equilibrium, wage income forms some 84.5% of total monetary 
income (the remainder being redistributed excess rents). Figure 1 show the equilibrium spatial 
patterns of some further variables of interest. Note for example that residential land rent near 
the CBD is around three times as high as the agricultural rent and lot sizes are around 2.5 
times as small. The convex shape of the equilibrium land rent is caused by both the possibility 
of substitution in consumption, and the fact that equilibrium per-unit-of distance transport 
costs increase towards the CBD. 
 Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  10







































































































































Legend:             Base 
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                          Cordon toll 
                          Flat km charge 
Figure 1. Key results for Cobb-Douglas utility 
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3.2.  First-best and second-best road pricing: Cobb-Douglas utility 
The model is used to evaluate the performance of two second-best road pricing schemes, 
relative to the base equilibrium and the benchmark of optimal Pigouvian congestion charging. 
For each of the three road pricing schemes, it is assumed that toll revenues are redistributed as 
a lump-sum benefit G, which is the optimal type of redistribution given that no initial labour 
taxes are existent (the alternative of recycling through negative labour taxes would distort the 
labour-leisure trade-off). Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium levels of the model’s main 
endogenous non-spatial variables, while Figure 1 compares spatial patterns for the main 
spatially differentiated variables. Before turning to these, it is useful to discuss the procedures 
used to find the optimal levels for the tax instruments. 
 
Finding first-best and second-best tax levels 
The first-best equilibrium was found by consistently applying space-varying per-unit-of-
distance Pigouvian congestion taxes as given in (17) in the transport market: 
) ( ) ( z mec z R = τ  (23a) 
The optimality of this policy (when revenues are redistributed in a lump-sum manner) was 
verified by investigating equilibrium utility levels for four perturbations of (23a). The first 
two applied tax rates τR(z)=0.9·mec(z) and τR(z)=1.1·mec. The other two tested ‘tilted’ tax 
schedules according to τR(z)=(0.9+0.2·z/z
*)·mec and τR(z)=(1.1-0.2·z/z
*)·mec. All perturbations 
led to utility levels below the first-level (U=0.373958), with deviations occurring only from 
the fifth digit onwards (the fifth and sixth digits became 48, 49, 44, and 43, respectively (in 
order of appearance of the perturbations above); compared to 58 for first-best pricing). 
  The second-best cordon tax requires the optimal choice of two instruments: the 













τ  (23b) 
As was the case for the model in Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003), no closed-form 
solutions for the second-best optimal levels of zcor and τcor could be found, and a heuristic grid 
search method was used to identify these. The method entails two stages. First, 4·4 
combinations of zcor and τcor were tested, and a ‘utility hill’ as shown in Figure 2 was 
constructed from the results by means of third-order interpolation. Its maximum entails the 
first-round prediction of zcor and τcor. Next, the same procedure was applied to again 4·4 
combinations of zcor and τcor, where for both the range was chosen to be between –20% and 
+20% of the first-round predictions. The prediction of optimal values in this second round 
was taken to give the second-best optimal instrument levels. Due to the flatness of the ‘utility 
hill’ near the second-best optimum, further refinement would seem redundant. 
  Figure 2 shows that equilibrium utility appears to be relatively speaking more sensitive 
to deviations in τcor than to deviations in zcor (a similar pattern was also found for the CES 
utility function). This is in some sense good news for the design of cordon toll schemes when Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  12
the regulator is uncertain about the second-best optimal levels of  τcor and zcor. Whereas the 
location of the cordon will often involve relatively large fixed costs due to installation of 
necessary equipment, toll levels are in principle more flexible. The pattern shown in Figure 2 
suggests that a relatively small mistake in the location of the cordon need not cause large 
relative welfare losses. The instrument for which mistakes are relatively speaking more 












Figure 2. ‘Utility hill’ for cordon charging 
The third congestion tolling scheme considered involves ‘flat’ (i.e., not differentiated over 
space) kilometre charges. The tax rate, τkm was again found by a heuristic procedure; a single-
nested one-dimensional variant of the procedure used for cordon charges. The implied road 
tolls now simply becomes:  









Figure 3. ‘Utility hill’ for flat kilometre charges 
Figure 3 depicts the ‘utility hill’ for this policy, with the central point being the second-best 
optimum. Again, flatness of the utility hill near the second-best optimum secures that small 





































USecond-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  13
The impacts and relative performance of first-best and second-best congestion pricing 
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the main findings. It is instructive to first consider the major 
impacts of first-best charging. This policy leads to reductions in aggregate kilometrage (KM) 
of around 21% and in aggregate commuting time (TC) of nearly 18%. These reductions are 
achieved partly by a 9% decrease in labour supply (and production), and a 12.4% decrease in 
city size (the latter explains why KM decreases more strongly than TC). The result is that 
utility increases by 0.42%; i.e., introduction of optimal congestion pricing raises utility by the 
same amount as equiproportional increases of y, s and Tf by 0.42% would. This may seem a 
modest increase at first sight, but it appears to be reasonably in line with recent predictions of 
surplus gains from optimal road pricing in urban areas.
4 
 
  Base equilibrium  First-best charging
a  Cordon charging
a  Flat km charging
a 
Policy instruments 
τL  0 0 0 0 
τR  0  see Fig. 1     
τcor     0.183   
zcor     20.59   
τkm      0.00269 
G  0  0.03326 0.02939 0.02296 
      
Endogenous variables 
L  286.866 90.95% 92.29% 92.71% 
Q  286.866 90.95% 92.29% 92.71% 
Y  194.847 92.52% 93.44% 96.31% 
z
*  92.02  87.62% 89.87% 85.09% 
R  54.115 100.84% 99.50% 115.40% 
KM
b  10860.4 78.95% 81.38% 78.63% 
TC
c  79.8824 82.16% 83.72% 81.38% 
TF
d  633.251 106.35% 105.56% 105.65% 
Toll  revenues  0  33.26 29.34 22.96 
Tax  revenues  0 0 0 0 
U  0.3724  100.42% 100.38% 100.39% 
ω  0 1  0.901  0.934 
Notes: 
a Percentages are relative to base equilibrium levels 
b Aggregate kilometrage, defined as ∫ z⋅n(z)⋅Tw(z) dz 
c Aggregate commuting time,  defined as ∫ n(z)⋅Tc(z) dz 
d Aggregate leisure time,  defined as ∫ n(z)⋅Tf(z) dz 
Table 1. The relative impacts of first-best and second-best congestion pricing schemes 
Figure 1 confirms that residential density increases throughout the city, while central rent rise 
and rents near the fringe fall (the latter is consistent with the fringe rent for the smaller 
optimal city still being equal to the agricultural rent). The consumption of y falls at nearly all 
locations (although close to the CBD the redistributed revenues dominate the toll payments 
                                                 
4 Lindsey et al. (2004) provide estimates of annual per capita social surplus gains from first-best road pricing for 
four European cities (Paris, Brussels, Helsinki and Oslo), which vary from € 111 – 403. The average of around € 
257 corresponds, in terms of our model, with 0.42% gain in a household’s gross budget if it amounts to around € 
61 000. If, as in our model, 35% of this gross budget is monetary, the households monetary income should be 
around € 21 500 to make the welfare gains from the present study comparable to those in Lindsey et al. (2004), 
which appears a reasonable order of magnitude. Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  14
and consumption increases), while the consumption of leisure increases as both labour supply 
and travel times fall. The concave spatial pattern of τR(z) confirms the intuitive notion that 
per-unit-of-distance tolls are zero at the city fringe and rise more than proportionally towards 
the CBD. Equilibrium utility of course remains constant over space, albeit that the level 
increases. 
Both second-best policies perform rather well in terms of relative welfare gains. Both 
accomplish more than 90% of first-best gains, as shown by the efficiency indicator ω (defined 
as the proportion of the first-best equilibrium utility increase that the policy achieves). 
The relative performance of the cordon charge, with ω=0.901, is well in line with the 
findings of Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003), who found ω=0.940 for their basic model. 
Although the relative welfare losses have, of course, nearly doubled, neither the sharp kinks 
that the policy produces at zcor (see Figure 1), nor the inherent distortions resulting from the 
inability of charging all road users and from applying imperfect charges to (nearly) all others, 
appear to seriously undermine the welfare gains – even when accounting for induced changes 
in residential densities and labour supply decisions. 
What causes cordon charges to be so efficient? Part of the explanation lies in the fact 
that it aggregate terms, the tax induces both a reduction in labour supply and a reduction in 
city size, which were the main two changes also induced by first-best taxes. The aggregate 
density increases (compared to the base equilibrium) for two reasons. First, land inside the 
cordon becomes relatively attractive, which drives up land rents and hence density (see Figure 
1). Secondly, the toll discourages labour supply outside the cordon, which translates – via 
reduced budgets – into lower land consumption and hence a higher density. Labour supply 
decreases for two reasons. Inside the cordon, the redistributed toll revenues increase the gross 
budget, which encourages the consumption of leisure. Outside the cordon, the toll discourages 
labour supply. Therefore, the cordon tax does induce the same two aggregate responses as 
first-best tolls do. Of course, the kinks introduced by the cordon toll – illustrated in Figure 1 – 
lead to welfare losses compared to first-best prices. But the diagrams show that, provided the 
cordon location and toll level are set optimally, spatial patterns of key variables under cordon 
charging are nevertheless relatively close to first-best results, with ‘too large’ levels inside the 
cordon compensated by ‘too low’ levels outside the cordon, and vice versa. 
The flat kilometre charge, with ω=0.934, performs even better than the cordon charge. 
Again, the policy succeeds in reducing both labour supply and city size. The modesty of 
welfare losses compared to first-best pricing is now intuitively explained that the per-unit-of-
distance tax rates are too low near the CBD, and too high near the fringe. Because households 
only consider the full-trip toll, there is a natural tendency for the two errors to cancel. 
Certainly, they can not cancel exactly for all z (which is why ω<1), but the optimal flat rate 
does a good job at finding a reasonably efficient compromise. In aggregate terms (Table 1), 
most results for flat km charges are comparable to those of cordon charging. The main 
exceptions are that optimal toll revenues are significantly lower, and aggregate excess land-
rents are significantly higher. The latter also exceed first-best rents, which is due to the fact Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  15
that the equilibrium bid-rent is, as expected, less convex under flat charges than under first-
best pricing, while the city size and the central rent are nearly identical. 
All in all, when comparing the two second-best instruments, the efficiency losses from 
the inability to differentiate tolls over space (under flat km charges) are apparently somewhat 
lower than the efficiency gains from avoiding kinks. When comparing both to first-best 
pricing, it is especially the high relative efficiency that remains surprising. In combination 
with the results of Mun, Kunishi and Yoshikawa (2003), this raises the hypothesis that the 
regularity of the spatial lay-out of the monocentric city probably yields good opportunities for 
minimizing the inherent distortions from which second-best congestion charging mechanisms 
suffer. This raises the question of whether the monocentric model is the appropriate model for 
studying the relative performance of such policies in reality. If anything, a generalization of 
these favourable results to polycentric cities seems premature. 
3.3.  First-best and second-best road pricing: CES utility 
The Cobb-Douglas utility function deployed up to this point may be critized for its restrictive 
assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution. It is therefore of some interest to investigate 
the impacts of the same policies when a more general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
utility function applies. This leads to changes in equations (4)–(9) above. Using primes to 
denote the relevant ‘CES’ equations, the relevant formulations become: 
() () () ()
ρ ρ ρ ρ δ δ δ
1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( z T z s z y z U f f s y ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ =  (4′) 
The elasticity of substitution, σ, is equal to 1/(1–ρ); while a convenient parameter when 
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The indirect utility can be written as (while writing M(z) in full): 
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The space-derivative of V in (6′) is a straightforward but tedious expression and is therefore 
suppressed, while for the implied first-order differential equation for r(z) – to obtain a 
constant utility over space – no closed-form analytical solution could be obtained. Numerical 
solutions, however, could be obtained, and these will be reported below. 
 
Calibration 
To obtain sufficient contrast with the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the elasticity of 
substitution σ was set equal to 0.5 (with the corresponding ρ and χ following as indicated in 
(4′)). To maximize comparability with the Cobb-Douglas model, all non-utility parameters 
were kept unchanged. Only the parameters δ therefore had to be calibrated, and these were set 
such that with weighted average prices from the Cobb-Douglas equilibrium ( 1 = p , 
* * / ) ( z r z R r A ⋅ + =  and a shadow price of leisure    − − = L f w p τ total toll revenues over total 
leisure), the budget shares from the CES utility function are equal to those from the Cobb-
Douglas function. Some basic manipulations reveal that this is achieved when, for 
consumption good x with a weighted average price  x p , δx from the CES function is related to 
αx from the Cobb-Douglas function according to 
χ α δ
1
/ x x x p = . This yielded δy=25.0; δs=70.6 
and δf=2.37. The base-case results in Table 2 confirm that the aggregate levels of equilibrium 
variables with the CES utility function are indeed close to those with the Cobb-Douglas 
function in Table 1. The spatial patterns shown in Figure 4 also reflect a close correspondence 
with the Cobb-Douglas results, albeit that the lower elasticity of substitution now causes a 
less pronounced differentiation of quantities consumed over space. 
 
First-best and second-best congestion pricing 
Table 2 shows the results of first-best and second-best congestion pricing for the CES utility 
function. The main conclusions are (1) that relative gains from congestion pricing, compared 
to the base equilibrium, are lower than under Cobb-Douglas utility due to the reduced 
sensitivity of households to price differences; and (2) the relative welfare gains of the two 
second-best policies, compared to first-best welfare gains, are nearly identical to those under 
Cobb-Douglas utility. In other words, the lower elasticity of substitution affects the size of Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  17
welfare gains from congestion pricing, but not the relative welfare gains from different 
pricing schemes. 
 
  Base equilibrium  First-best charging
a  Cordon charging
a  Flat km charging
a 
Policy instruments 
τL  0 0 0 0 
τR  0  see Fig. 2     
τcor     0.208   
zcor     24.03   
τkm      0.00282 
G  0  0.03920 0.03475 0.02774 
      
Endogenous variables 
L  284.552 94.69% 95.37% 95.66% 
Q  284.552 94.69% 95.37% 95.66% 
Y  193.509 95.48% 95.88% 97.60% 
z
*  91.0437 93.01% 94.29% 91.53% 
R  57.9265 108.58% 107.19% 125.91% 
KM
b  11228.9 87.73% 89.12% 87.58% 
TC
c  86.5438 89.76% 90.73% 89.31% 
TF
d  628.904 103.81% 103.37% 103.43% 
Toll  revenues  0  39.20 34.76 27.74 
Tax  revenues  0  0.00 0.00 0.00 
U  0.964227 100.26% 100.24% 100.24% 
ω  0 1  0.906  0.934 
Notes: 
a Percentages are relative to base equilibrium levels 
b Aggregate kilometrage, defined as ∫ z⋅n(z)⋅Tw(z) dz 
c Aggregate commuting time,  defined as ∫ n(z)⋅Tc(z) dz 
d Aggregate leisure time,  defined as ∫ n(z)⋅Tf(z) dz 
Table 2. The relative impacts of first-best and second-best congestion pricing schemes: CES utility 
4. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper suggest that the surprisingly optimistic conclusions that 
Mun, Konishi and Yoshikawa (2003) reach on the relative performance of cordon pricing in 
the monocentric city are robust with respect to the inclusion of residential land markets, 
endogenous labour supply and general spatial equilibrium formulation conditions. Moreover, 
the result is obtained both for Cobb-Douglas and CES utility functions. This raises the 
suspicion that the regular monocentric configuration, which moreover ignores transport 
network effects, may be the responsible factor for this counter-intuitive result. The analysis 
furthermore showed that also flat kilometre charges perform surprisingly well in this setting – 
even slightly outperforming cordon charges. 
  A future research agenda is easily sketched. One line of research would endogenize 
the formation of (sub-)centres, by endogenizing firm location decisions and agglomeration 
advantages. A second line of research enabled by the model proposed in this paper concerns 
the investigation of second-best distortions in congestion pricing as arising from the existence 
of distortionary labour taxes in a spatial general equilibrium setting.  
 Second-best congestion pricing schemes in the monocentric city  18
 











































































































































Legend:             Base 
                          First-best 
                          Cordon toll 
                          Flat km charge 
Figure 4. Key results for CES utility 
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